Admissibility has been studied for games of infinite duration with Boolean objectives. We extend here this study to games of infinite duration with quantitative objectives. First, we show that, under the assumption that optimal worst-case and cooperative strategies exist, admissible strategies are guaranteed to exist. Second, we give a characterization of admissible strategies using the notion of adversarial and cooperative values of a history, and we characterize the set of outcomes that are compatible with admissible strategies. Finally, we show how these characterizations can be used to design algorithms to decide relevant verification and synthesis problems.
Introduction
Two-player zero-sum graph games are the most studied mathematical model to formalize the reactive synthesis problem [15, 16] . Unfortunately, this mathematical model is often an abstraction that is too coarse. Realistic systems are usually made up of several components, all of them with their own objectives. These objectives are not necessarily antagonistic. Hence, the setting of non-zero sum graph games is now investigated in order to unleash the full potential of automatic synthesis algorithms for reactive systems, see e.g. [2, 5, 6, 9, 12, 14] . For a player with objective ϕ, a strategy σ is said to be dominated by a strategy σ if σ does as well as σ with respect to ϕ against all the strategies of the other players and strictly better for some of them. A strategy σ is admissible for a player if it is not dominated by any other of his strategies. Clearly, playing a strategy which is not admissible is sub-optimal and a rational player should only play admissible strategies. The elimination of dominated strategies can be iterated if one assumes that each player knows the other players know that only admissible strategies are played, and so on.
While admissibility is a classical notion for finite games in normal form, see e.g. [13] and pointers therein, its generalization to infinite duration games is challenging and was only considered more recently. In 2007, Berwanger was the first to show [2] that admissibility, i.e. the avoidance of dominated strategies, is well-behaved in infinite duration n-player nonzero sum turn-based games with perfect information and Boolean outcomes (two possible payoffs: win or lose). This framework encompasses games with omega-regular objectives. 2 has a strategy to enforce value 2 and taking edge (v 2 , v 1 ) is unreasonable because, in the worst case, from v 1 he will only obtain 0. As we show in Sec. 6, this kind of reasoning can be made formal and automated. We will show that, for games with classical quantitative measures, it can indeed be decided algorithmically if a finite memory strategy given, for instance, as a finite state Moore machine, is admissible or not.
Second, a similar but more subtle reasoning to the one presented above allows us to conclude that Player 1 will eventually play the edge (v 1 , v 2 ). Indeed, from vertex v 1 , Player 1 can force a payoff equal to 1 by either taking edge (v 1 , v 3 ) or (v 1 , v 2 ). Nevertheless, it is not reasonable for him to play edge (v 1 , v 3 ) because, while this choice enforces a worst-case payoff equal to 1 (the antagonistic value), playing edge (v 1 , v 2 ) is better because it ensures the same worst-case payoff and additionally leaves a possibility for Player 2 to help him by taking the cycle v 2 -v 4 , giving him a payoff of 2. If we take into account that the adversary is playing admissible strategies, then, in the words of [4] , we can solve the assume-admissible synthesis problem. In this example, we conclude that Player 1 has a strategy to enforce a payoff of 2 against all admissible strategies of Player 2. A strategy which eventually chooses edge (v 1 , v 2 ) ensures this payoff. The formalization of this reasoning and elements necessary for its automation are presented in Sec. 6.
Structure of the paper. Sec. 2 contains definitions. In Sec. 3, we study conditions under which the existence of admissible strategies is guaranteed. In Sec. 4, we give a characterization of admissible strategies, and in Sec. 5, a description of the set of outcomes compatible with admissible strategies. In Sec. 6, we apply our results to solve relevant decision problems on games with classical quantitative measures.
Preliminaries
We denote by R the set of real numbers, Q the set of rational numbers, N the set of natural numbers, and N >0 the set of positive integers.
A game is a tuple G = P, (V i ) i∈P , v init , E, (payoff i ) i∈P where: (i) P is the non-empty and finite set of players. (ii) V def = i∈P V i where for every i ∈ P , V i is the finite set of player i's vertices, and v init ∈ V is the initial vertex. (iii) E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges (it is assumed, w.l.o.g., that each vertex in V has at least one outgoing edge.) (iv) For every i in P , payoff i is a payoff function from infinite paths in the digraph V, E to R that, intuitively, player i will attempt to maximize.
An outcome ρ is an infinite path in the digraph V, E , i.e. an infinite sequence of vertices (ρ j ) j∈N>0 such that (ρ j , ρ j+1 ) ∈ E, for all j ∈ N >0 . A finite prefix of an outcome is called a history. The length |h| of a history h = (ρ j ) 1≤j≤n is n. Given an outcome ρ = (ρ j ) j∈N>0 and an integer k, we write ρ ≤k for the history (ρ j ) 1≤j≤k , that is, the prefix of length k of ρ. For a history h and a history or outcome ρ, we write h ⊆ pref ρ if h is a prefix of ρ. If h ⊆ pref ρ, we write h −1 · ρ for the unique history (resp. outcome) that satisfies ρ = h · (h −1 · ρ). The first (resp. last) vertex of a history h is first(h) = h 1 (resp. last(h) def = h |h| ). The longest XX:4 Admissibility in Quantitative Graph Games common prefix of two outcomes or histories ρ, ρ is denoted lcp(ρ, ρ ). Given vertex v from G, let us denote the set of successors of v by
A strategy of player i is a function σ i that maps any history h such that last(h) ∈ V i to a vertex from E last(h) . A strategy profile for the set of players P ⊆ P is a tuple of strategies, one for each player of P .
Let Σ i (G) be the set of all strategies of player i in G. We write Σ(G) def = i∈P Σ i (G) for the set of all strategy profiles for P in G, and Σ −i (G) for the set of strategy profiles for all players but i in G. We omit G when it is clear from the context. Given σ i ∈ Σ i and σ −i = (σ j ) j∈P \{i} ∈ Σ −i , we write (σ i , σ −i ) for (σ j ) j∈P .
A strategy profile σ P ∈ Σ defines a unique outcome from any given history h. Formally,
Notice that when h is a vertex, then this corresponds to starting the game at that vertex. When G is clear from the context we shall omit it and write simply Out h (σ P ). If S i is a set of strategies for player i, we write
Here, Out h (S i ) is the set of outcomes that are compatible with S i . All notations for outcomes are lifted to histories in the obvious way. For a strategy profile σ P ∈ Σ, we write Hist h (σ P ) for the set {ρ ≤j | ρ ∈ Out h (σ P ), j ≥ |h|}.
Consider two strategies σ and τ for player i, and a history h. We denote by σ [h ← τ ] the strategy that follows strategy σ and shifts to τ at history h.
Formally, given a history h such that last(h ) ∈ V i :
We now formally define dominance and admissibility. We recall the intuition: a player's strategy σ is dominated by another strategy σ of his if σ yields a payoff which is as good as that of σ against all strategies for the other players, and is strictly better against some of them. A strategy is admissible if no other strategy dominates it. More formally, we have:
. Strategy σ i weakly dominates strategy σ i , written σ σ , if σ σ and ¬(σ σ). A strategy σ ∈ Σ i is weakly dominated if there exists σ ∈ Σ i such that σ σ. A strategy that is not weakly dominated is admissible. We denote by A i (G) the set of all admissible strategies for player i in G.
Our characterizations and algorithms are based on the notions of cooperative and antagonistic values of a history. The antagonistic value, denoted aVal i (G, h), is the maximum payoff that player i can secure from h in the worst case, i.e. against all strategies of other players. The cooperative value, denoted cVal i (G, h), is the best value player i can achieve from h with the help of other players. We also define a third type of value: the antagonisticcooperative value, denoted acVal i (G, h), which is the maximum value player i can achieve in G with the help of other players while guaranteeing the antagonistic value of the current history h. Formal definitions follow.
Antagonistic & Cooperative Values.
The antagonistic value of a strategy and the cooperative value of a strategy σ i of player i in G, for a history h are
The antagonistic value of a history h for player i, and the cooperative value of a history h for player i are defined as Figure 3 Example game with an infinite dominance chain and no admissible strategy as witness of their being dominated.
sup σi∈Σi cVal i (G, h, σ i ), respectively. Finally, the antagonistic-cooperative value of a history h for player i is
We omit G when it is clear from the context.
Observe that aVal i (h) of a history is the value of a zero-sum two-player game where player i is playing against players −i; while cVal i (h) is the value in a one-player game, when all players play together. acVal i (h) is a new notion which is the supremum of the values player i can obtain when he plays worst-case optimal strategies. A strategy σ i ∈ Σ i is said to be worst-case optimal for player i at history h if aVal i (h, σ i ) = aVal i (h); it is said to be cooperatively optimal for him at history h if cVal i (h, σ i ) = cVal i (h). Observe that acVal i (h) = −∞ if there are no worst-case optimal strategies from h. Example 1 (Local conditions are not sufficient). The game in Fig. 2 shows that admissibility requires one to consider the values of the histories both in the past and in the future of the current history. This shows that a local condition cannot capture admissibility. In fact, consider strategy σ 1 of player 1 (who controls all square vertices) that takes the edges (s 1 , s 2 ), (s 4 , s 6 ). If the game starts at s 2 , σ 1 is admissible, since the choice (s 4 , s 5 ) could yield a payoff of 2 which is worse than any payoff from s 6 . Indeed, we have that aVal 1 (s 5 ) < aVal 1 (s 6 ). However, when the game starts at s 1 , σ 1 is weakly dominated by the strategy that chooses (s 1 , s 3 ) since the worst payoff in the latter case is 5. In fact, when a strategy takes the edge (s 1 , s 2 ), the antagonistic value decreases from aVal 1 (s 1 ) = 5 to aVal 1 (s 2 ) = 3; so to be admissible, it should have a better cooperative value than 5, which is not the case if (s 4 , s 6 ) is taken. The strategy taking (s 1 , s 2 ), (s 4 , s 5 ) is admissible. Indeed, in one outcome, the payoff is 9, which is greater than 5 as required. Thus, an admissible strategy from s 1 either goes to s 3 , or goes to s 2 but commits to taking (s 4 , s 5 ) later.
We use temporal logic to describe sets of outcomes. We consider an extension of standard LTL with inequality conditions on payoffs for each player as in [3] . The logic, denoted LTL payoff , extends LTL, and its syntax is defined as follows.
where Q ∈ AP is a set of atomic propositions on edges, G and F are the standard LTL modalities, ∈ {≤, ≥, <, >}, and v ∈ Q. A formula is interpreted over an outcome ρ at index k as follows. We have, for instance, (ρ, k) |= Q if, and only if, (ρ k , ρ k+1 ) is labelled with Q. For convenience, we write ρ |= ϕ instead of (ρ, 1) |= ϕ. Note that we define our predicates on edges rather than vertices; this simplifies our presentation. The semantics of the LTL modalities are standard; we refer to e.g. [3] . For payoff conditions, we have
Residual Games. Given game G, and history h, let us define G h as the residual game of G from h by modifying the initial state to last(h), and the payoff functions to payoff i defined as follows. For all outcomes ρ that start in last(h), payoff i (ρ) = payoff i (h ρ), where h ρ = h ≤|h|−1 · ρ. Notice that the strategy sets of G and G h are identical, and that for any σ P ∈ Σ P , we have Out(G h , σ P ) = Out last(h) (G, σ P ).
Lemma 2. For all
h ∈ Hist last(h) (G), it holds that aVal i (G h , h ) = aVal i (G, h h ), acVal i (G h , h ) = acVal i (G, h h ), and cVal i (G h , h ) = cVal i (G, h h ).
Existence of Admissible Strategies
We start this section with two examples of quantitative games with no admissible strategies (for player 1). Then we identify a large and natural class of games for which the existence of admissible strategies is guaranteed.
Game G. Consider the games A and G in Fig. 4 . Starting at s 1 , the payoff of player 1, in the two games is defined as follows: an outcome that does not visit s 3 has a payoff equal to 0, otherwise, the payoff is equal to the number of times vertex a appears in the outcome. The lemma below states that player 1 does not have admissible strategies in those two games. We sketch the proof idea.
Consider first the one-player game A. The antagonistic value at vertex s 1 is ∞. Any strategy which never visits s 3 is weakly dominated by strategies that visit a at least once (i.e. with outcome (s 1 as 1 ) + s ω 3 ). Furthermore, a strategy which does visit s 3 and k times a is weakly dominated by any strategy that visits a at least k + 1 times and then goes to s 3 .
The idea is similar for G where the cooperative value at s 1 is ∞. Every strategy which does not allow outcomes visiting s 3 are weakly dominated by those that attempt to visit a by visiting s 2 at least once (as from s 2 , the other player can cooperate and visit a), and then go to s 3 . Moreover, it is always possible to attempt to visit a once more before going to s 3 , thus any strategy which eventually goes to s 3 is also weakly dominated.
Lemma 3. Player 1 does not have admissible strategies in games G and A.
In the two examples above, either the aVal or the cVal (which are both equal to ∞) are not achievable. This is not a coincidence. We now show that all the games that admit witnessing strategies for those values are guaranteed to have admissible strategies.
Games with strategies witnessing aVal and cVal. A game is well-formed whenever it admits witnessing strategies for aVal and cVal, i.e. it satisfies:
1. For all i ∈ P , and h ∈ Hist vinit (G),
These conditions will also be referred as Assumption 1 and 2. We now establish the existence of admissible strategies for all well-formed games.
Theorem 4. In all well-formed games all players have admissible strategies.
The result follows from Lemmas. 6 and 7 below: the proof consists in showing that a particular type of admissible strategies, called strongly cooperative-optimal, always exists. Usually, those strategies are only a strict subset of the admissible strategies available to a player. Nevertheless, they are peculiar as they are guaranteed to exist.
Strongly cooperative-optimal strategies are admissible because their cooperative values are always maximal, and moreover, if a payoff better than the antagonistic value cannot be achieved (aVal i (h) = cVal i (h)), then they are worst-case optimal. Any strategy which obtains a better payoff than a SCO strategy against some adversary will obtain a worse payoff against another one.
Lemma 6. All strongly cooperative-optimal strategies are admissible.
Proof. Let σ i be a strongly cooperative-optimal strategy for player i. Assume towards a contradiction that some σ i weakly dominates σ i . Let h be any minimal history compatible
If
as the histories hσ i (h) and hσ
This contradicts that σ i weakly dominates σ i .
Otherwise
It follows that no outcome of σ i obtains a better payoff than σ i . We thus obtain a contradiction.
By Lem. 6, to prove the existence of admissible strategies, it suffices to prove the existence of strongly cooperative-optimal strategies. We actually give a constructive proof.
Lemma 7. In all well-formed games all players have SCO strategies.
Let us describe the idea of the construction. Consider any player i. We define the strategy σ of player i as follows. For any history h, if aVal i (h) = cVal i (h), then σ plays a worst-case optimal strategy from h, say σ wco h . Otherwise, we define σ starting from an outcome ρ h with payoff i = cVal i (h), and we define σ is such a way that it follows ρ h . In this case, whenever another player deviates from ρ h , say, at history h , we reevaluate how to play according to whether
Here, the existence of σ wco h and that of ρ h are guaranteed by the fact that the game is well-formed. In subsequent sections, we consider SCO strategies in residual games G h , so let us note that these games satisfy the required assumptions if G does, which follows from Lem. 2.
Lemma 8. For any well-formed game G, for all histories h ∈ Hist vinit , the residual game G h is also well-formed.
We end this section with an interesting observation: an infinite weak dominance chain is not necessarily dominated by an admissible strategy, as shown in the next example. The reader should contrast the example with the fact that in the Boolean case all dominated strategies are dominated by an admissible strategy [2, Thm. 11].
Example 9 (Non-dominated weak dominance chains). There are quantitative games that have infinite dominance chains and no "maximal" admissible strategy weakly dominating them. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 3 . Denote by σ k the strategy of player 1 (controlling square vertices) which consists in moving from s 1 to s 2 exactly k times, and then going left (unless payoff of 2 was reached in the meantime). Then for all k ∈ N, σ k is weakly dominated by σ k+1 because if the adversary decides to move right from s 2 at the (k + 1)-th step, σ k+1 performs better than σ k , and otherwise they yield identical outcomes. It follows that all strategies σ k for k ≥ 0, are dominated. Here, the only admissible strategy σ ∞ consists in looping in the cycle forever, which does not dominate any σ k since if the adversary always moves left from s 2 , then σ ∞ yields less than σ k .
Remark. Above, we have defined strongly cooperative-optimal strategies that favour cooperation whenever it can have an added value. We have established that those strategies are always admissible. There are other classes of strategies that are always admissible, and we define another interesting class here. A strategy σ i is a worst-case cooperative optimal strategy, if for all h ∈ Hist vinit (σ i ):
So those strategies ensure the worst-case value at all times and leave open the best cooperation possible under that worst-case guarantee.
Lemma 10. All worst-case cooperative optimal strategies strategies are admissible.
However, some well-formed games do not have worst-case cooperative optimal strategies.
Value-based Characterization of Admissible Strategies
We present our main result, which is, a value-based characterization of admissible strategies. For any game G, and player i, let us define the following property, denoted (h, σ), for a given strategy σ ∈ Σ i (G) and history h:
Intuitively, we will show that a strategy is admissible if at all histories, either the strategy promises a cooperative value greater than the antagonistic value at the current vertex, or a higher cooperative value cannot be obtained without risking a lower antagonistic value (i.e. aVal i (h) = acVal i (h)) and the strategy is worst-case optimal.
It turns out that requiring this property at all histories ending in a player's vertices characterize admissible strategies. We state our result in the following theorem.
Theorem 11. Under Assumption 1, for any game G, player i, and σ i ∈ Σ i (G), σ i is admissible if, and only if, for all
It will be useful to consider the negation of (h, σ), which we simplify as follows:
Lemma 12. For all histories h and strategy σ, the negation of (h, σ) is equivalent to
Proof of Thm. 11. ⇒ We prove the contrapositive. Assume that ∃h ∈ Hist vinit (G, σ i ), last(h) ∈ V i and ¬ (h, σ i ). Then by Lem. 12, either (3) or (4) holds for (h, σ i ).
Assume (3) holds for (h, σ i ). By Assumption 1, there exists a worst-case optimal strategy σ wco
by definition of cVal i (·). Thus, σ i very weakly dominates σ i . Since by assumption, aVal i (h, σ i ) < aVal i (h), and h is compatible with σ i , there is a strategy
Assume now that (4) holds. Consider ε > 0 small enough so that
dominates σ i . In fact, the outcomes are identical for any outcome not compatible with h.
⇐ Assume that for all h ∈ Hist vinit (G, σ i ) with last(h) ∈ V i , we have (h, σ i ), and that σ i is weakly dominated by some strategy σ i . We will show a contradiction.
Let σ −i be a strategy in Σ −i (G) and
and otherwise let j be the first index where they differ, and h = ρ ≤j−1 = ρ ≤j−1 . We have that h is compatible with both strategies, last(h) ∈ V i and σ i (h) = σ i (h).
If (1) holds, that is, cVal
. Such a strategy profile σ −i exists since hσ i (h) and hσ i (h) are distinct, and since last(h) ∈ V i . The latter also implies that aVal i (h) ≥ aVal i (h, σ i ). It thus follows that
contradicting the fact that σ i weakly dominates σ i . Therefore (2) must hold, and acVal i (h) = aVal i (h). If there exists j ≥ |h| such that aVal i (ρ ≤j ) < aVal i (h), then there exists ε > 0 and a strategy profile σ −i ∈ Σ −i compatible with h which ensures that
). This contradicts σ weakly dominating σ. Hence for all j ≥ |h|, aVal i (ρ ≤j ) ≥ aVal i (h). Now, observe that payoff i (ρ ) ≤ acVal i (h). In fact, one can construct a strategy τ , which, from h follows ρ , and in case another player does not respect ρ, switches to a worst-case optimal strategy ensuring
This being true for all strategies of Σ −i proves that σ i very weakly dominates σ i and contradicts that σ i weakly dominates σ i .
Characterization of the Outcomes of Admissible Strategies
Observe that the characterization of Thm. 11 does not immediately yield an effective representation of the set of admissible strategies. In order to reason about the possible behaviors observable in a game under admissible strategies we are interested in describing the set of outcomes that can be observed when all players play admissible strategies. In this section, for each player, we give a linear temporal logic description of the outcomes that are each compatible with at least one admissible strategy.
Note that our main goal is to obtain such a characterization in full generality, for all well-formed games so we defer computability considerations to the next section. We will then see how the three types of values can be computed at all histories.
Let us fix a game G, and player i. We present the intuition of the characterization. If an outcome ρ is compatible with an admissible strategy, say σ i , then all prefixes h with last(h) ∈ V i must satisfy (1) 
Extended LTL payoff . Let aValues i = {aVal i (h) | h is a history} be the set of antagonistic values of player i. We will now define atomic propositions attached to edges of a game. Formally, we have a labelling function λ : E → P(AP) which assigns to every edge a set of propositions from AP. The set AP includes the proposition V i whose truth value, for every edge e = (u, v), is determined as follows:
We consider LTL payoff with atomic propositions as defined above and additional propositions aVal i q , acVal i q , and gAlt i q defined for all q ∈ aValues i . The semantics of these are straightforward: for an outcome ρ and k ∈ N >0 we have
with the convention that, when k is omitted, we assume it is 1.
As mentioned earlier, we consider two cases depending on whether (1) or (2) hold. Thus, let us define the corresponding two sub-formulas:
We define the following formula which will be shown to capture the outcomes of admissible strategies:
Theorem 13. For any well-formed game G, outcome ρ satisfies Φ i adm if, and only if, it is compatible with an admissible strategy for player i.
We give the idea of the proof. For any outcome ρ compatible with an admissible strategy σ i for player i. We show that for any prefix h of ρ with last(h) ∈ V i , (ρ, |h|) satisfies either ϕ 1 or ϕ 2 . In fact, by Thm. 11, either (1) or (2) hold, and we show that these correspond to ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 .
Conversely, for any ρ satisfying Φ i adm , we construct an admissible strategy σ i for player i compatible with ρ. The strategy follows ρ, and in case of deviation, it switches immediately either to an SCO-which is guaranteed to exist-or to a worst-case optimal strategy, depending on whether ϕ 1 or ϕ 2 holds at the current history. The resulting strategy is proven to be admissible.
Assuming prefix-independence. Before concluding this section, let us consider the consequences of further assuming that our payoff function is prefix-independent.
3. For all i ∈ P , for all outcomes ρ, it holds that ∀j ∈ N, payoff i ((ρ k ) k≥j ) = payoff i (ρ).
Observe that, under Assumption 3, the set aValues i can be equivalently defined as {aVal i (v) | v ∈ V } and is thus finite. One can also extend the labelling λ and set of atomic propositions AP such that, for every edge e = (u, v) and q ∈ aValues i :
It immediately follows that:

Lemma 14. Under Assumption 3, for all i ∈ P , Φ i
adm is expressible in LTL payoff .
Applications and Future Works
In this section, we show how to apply Theorem 11 (value-based characterization of admissible strategies) and Theorem 13 (characterization of the set of outcomes of admissible strategies) to solve relevant verification and synthesis problems.
Classical payoff functions. So far, we have assumed that games were equipped for each player i ∈ P with a payoff function. To define payoff functions, we proceed as usual by first assigning weights to edges of the game graph using weight functions w i : E → Q, one for each player i ∈ P . With the weight function w i , we associate to each outcome ρ = ρ 1 ρ 2 . . . ρ n . . . , an infinite sequence of rational values
. . , and we aggregate this sequence of values with measures such as Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, and mean payoff (MP and MP). It is well known, see e.g. [7] and [18] , that all the payoff functions defined above satisfy Assumptions 1-2. By Theorem 4, we get the following.
Lemma 15. In games with payoff functions from Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, and MP, all players have admissible strategies.
It is also known that, in games defined with the payoff functions considered here, the antagonistic and cooperative values (cVal and aVal) are computable. One can also show that acVal is computable for prefix-independent payoff functions. Indeed, this value of a vertex coincides with the cVal inside the sub-graph induced by the vertices with the optimal antagonistic value. Furthermore, using a classical transformation on the game structure, we can guarantee that all payoff functions above are prefix-independent. We thus obtain the following result, by Lemma 14.
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Lemma 16. In games with payoff functions from Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, and MP, the formulas Φ i adm for all i ∈ P are effectively computable, finite, and expressible in LTL payoff .
We will now consider several problems of interest which can be solved using the characterizations that we have developed in the previous sections. All the results are applicable to the measures concerned by Lemmas 15 and 16.
Deciding the admissibility of a finite memory strategy. As a first example, we consider the problem of deciding, given a game structure G, and a (finite memory) strategy σ i for player i ∈ P described as a finite state transducer M i , if σ i is admissible in G.
To solve this problem, we rely on Theorem 11 and proceed as follows. First, we compute for each vertex v of the game G, the values aVal i (G, v), cVal i (G, v), and acVal i (G, v) . Second, we construct the synchronized product between the transducer M i that defines the strategy σ i and the game G. Model-checking under admissibility. We now turn to the following problem. Given a game structure G and a LTL payoff formula ϕ, decide if all outcomes of the game that are compatible with the admissible strategies of all players satisfy ϕ, i.e. if i∈P Out(G, A i (G)) |= ϕ. This problem was introduced in the Boolean setting in [5] and allows one to check that a property is induced by the rationality of the players in a game. =⇒ ϕ. For all payoff functions, except mean-payoff, this can be reduced to model checking an LTL formula (since the measures are regular). For MP and MP, the result follows from [3] which shows that the model checking problem against LTL payoff is decidable.
Quantitative assume-admissible synthesis. In [4] , a new rule for reactive synthesis in non-zero sum n-player games was proposed. The setting there is similar to the setting considered here but it is Boolean: each player i ∈ P has his own omega-regular objective
The synthesis rule asks if player i ∈ P has a strategy to enforce its own objective O i against admissible strategies of the other players. In other words, the rule asks for the existence of worst-case optimal strategies against rational adversaries.
The quantitative extension of this problem asks given a game G, a player i ∈ P , and a LTL payoff formula ϕ, ∃σ ∈ A i , ∀τ ∈ A −i , ϕ. Using Theorem 13, we can reduce this query to a plain two-player zero-sum game on the game structure G with objective:
Since for Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, Φ i adm and ϕ are omega-regular, the problem reduces to deciding the winner in a two-player zero-sum game with omega-regular objectives. As a consequence, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 19. The quantitative assume-admissible synthesis problem for player i ∈ P is decidable for measures Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup.
For the measures MP, MP, we obtain objectives in which mean-payoff constraints and omega-regular constraints are mixed. On the one hand, those objectives are outside known decidable classes of objectives treated in [8] and in [10] . On the other hand, the undecidability results obtained in [17] do not apply to them. This motivates further research on zero-sum two player games with a mix of mean-payoff and omega-regular objectives.
Towards iterative elimination. Once we have computed the admissible strategies for each player, we restrict each player to these strategies, and repeat the computation of the admissible strategies in the restricted game. This can be iterated several times and gives a process that is called iterative elimination of dominated strategies, and well known in game theory. This process is difficult to analyze for mean-payoff, because objectives of different players interfere in non-trivial ways and games with Boolean combinations of mean-payoff objectives are undecidable [17] . However it seems feasible for regular payoffs, such as Inf, Sup, LimInf and LimSup, for which we can construct parity automata recognizing outcomes with payoff i > q. Given i ≥ 0, we can actually compute a parity automaton accepting the set of outcomes of S i which is the set of strategies that remain after i steps of elimination. We summarize here the ingredients but leave the details for future work. Assume we have a parity automaton representing the outcomes of S i . Note that for i = 0 this is simply all outcomes. If the payoffs are regular, then we can compute values cVal i (h, S i ), aVal i (h, S i ) and acVal i (h, S i ), which correspond to cooperative, antagonistic, and antagonist-cooperative values when players only play strategies from S i . We can then use these values as atomic propositions for a LTL payoff formulas similar to Φ i adm of Section 5, which characterizes outcomes of strategies of S i+1 . In the case of regular payoffs this yields a parity automaton which represents the outcomes of S i+1 . This procedure can then be repeated to compute outcomes that are possible under iterative elimination.
Formal definition of the considered payoff functions
We recall the definition of the measures below:
the Inf (Sup) payoff, is the minimum (maximum) weight seen along an outcome:
the LimInf (LimSup) payoff, is the minimum (maximum) weight seen infinitely often: v i+1 ) ; the mean-payoff value, i.e. the limiting average weight, defined using lim inf or lim sup since the running averages might not converge: MP(π) = lim inf k→∞
Proof of Lem. 2 Proof. We have
Now for each fixed τ ,
since for any σ on the left-hand side, one can define a strategy σ by: σ (g) = σ(g ≥|h| ) if h h ⊆ pref g, and defined arbitrarily otherwise. This proves that the LHS is less than or equal to the RHS. Conversely, for any σ on the right hand side, we can define σ by
The cases for acVal i and cVal i are shown similarly.
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Proof of Lem. 3
Proof. As we noted above, the antagonistic (thus the cooperative) value at vertex s 1 is ∞. Given any strategy σ, if s 3 is never visited, then σ is clearly weakly dominated by a strategy that follows the outcome (s 1 s 2 a)s where h does not contain s 3 . Then, σ is weakly dominated by a strategy that generates h(s 2 as 1 )s ω 3 whose payoff is greater than that of σ. Thus, all strategies are weakly dominated. Let us now show that player 1 has no admissible strategy in G. Consider any strategy σ. Assume that s 3 is never visited by σ on compatible histories. In this case, the strategy that goes to s 2 once, and then goes to s 3 dominates σ. In fact, its payoff is 0 in the worst-case, and for some adversary strategy, it yields a payoff of 1. Assume otherwise that at some history h with last(h) = s 1 , σ goes to s 3 . We have that
where |h| a is the number of a's in h. Let us define σ identically to σ, except that at h, it goes to s 2 , and at the next visit to s 1 , it goes to s 3 . Then σ dominates σ. In fact, for all strategies τ ∈ Σ −i , with h ⊆ pref Out(σ, τ ), we have Out(σ , τ ) = Out(σ, τ ). For all τ ∈ Σ −i for which h is a prefix of Out(σ, τ ), the payoff is aVal i (h). On the other hand, Out(σ , τ ) has payoff at least aVal i (h), and for some particular τ 0 ∈ Σ −i , the payoff of Out(σ , τ 0 ) is aVal i (h) + 1. It follows that σ is weakly dominated.
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Proof of Lem. 7
Proof. We construct a strongly cooperative-optimal strategy for player i, as follows. For each history h with aVal i (h) < cVal i (h), let us fix an outcome ρ h with h ⊆ pref ρ h such that payoff i (ρ h ) > aVal i (h). Such an outcome exists by Assumption 2; let us denote by (σ sco h , σ sco h,−i ) any strategy profile compatible with ρ h . Furthermore, for each h with aVal i (h) = cVal i (h), we fix a strategy σ wco h such that aVal i (h, σ wco h ) = aVal i (h), which exists by Assumption 1. Informally, we define our strategy σ as follows. If aVal i (h) = cVal i (h), then we switch to σ wco h . Otherwise, we start following ρ h , and whenever a player deviates from ρ h , say, at history h with h ⊆ pref h , we start again according to whether aVal i (h ) < cVal i (h ).
Let us now formalize the strategy described in the core of the paper. In particular, we need to describe the set of histories at which the strategy switches to ρ h or to σ wco h . We define decision points D as a set of histories, where such a decision will be made, incrementally. We define D i , for each i, such that D 0 ∪ . . . ∪ D i contains at least all decision points of length at most i, and possibly some additional longer decision points. We will then let D = ∪ i≥0 D i . Here, notice that for all j ≥ i, {h ∈ Hist vinit , |h| ≤ i} ∩ D j is constant. So the union can be seen as a limit.
Initially, for i = 0, v init ∈ D 0 . Consider now i > 0, and assume
, then we add to D i+1 all histories of the following set:
In other terms, all histories extending h, and deviating from ρ h by one step due to some player in −i, and those prefixes of ρ h where the antagonistic value equals the cooperative value.
For any h, let us define d(h) as the longest prefix of h that belongs to D. This is well defined since v init ∈ D. We now define our strategy σ as
We now show that Claim 20. σ is SCO.
The desired result follows.
For any history h with aVal i (h) = cVal i (h), we have that
, and by definition of D, h ∈ D, which is a contradiction. Now,
, and since cVal i (·) cannot increase along a history, we have cVal i (h) ≤ cVal i (d(h)). We get that Consider now history h with
by construction of σ; and we have (1). Assume otherwise. We cannot have 
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Proof of Lem. 12
Proof. The negation of (3) ∨ (4) yields
We can rewrite the first line as follows
The second term implies
, and is thus equivalent to aVal i (h, σ) = cVal i (h, σ) = aVal i (h). Using this, and distributing the conjunction over the disjunction, we get
Simplifying the second term yields the equivalence with (1) ∨ (2).
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Proof of Thm. 13
. We first need the following lemma, which formalizes the following intuition: for any outcome compatible with a given strategy, if acVal coincides with the aVal at some position, and aVal does not decrease from that point on, then acVal and aVal are constant in the rest of the outcome. A proof of the claim is given in appendix.
Lemma 21. Let G be a game, h ∈ Hist vinit be a history, σ i a strategy of player i, and ρ an outcome extending h compatible with σ i , i.e. ρ ∈ Out h (σ i ). Assume there exists j ≥ |h| such that acVal i (ρ ≤j ) = aVal i (ρ ≤j ). The following hold
and for all k ≥ j we have acVal(ρ ≤k ) = aVal(ρ ≤k ) = acVal(ρ ≤j ) = aVal(ρ ≤j ).
Proof.
(a) Consider an arbitrary k > j. We first note that the players −i cannot decrease aVal; more precisely, it follows form the definition of aVal that for any j with
We will now argue that acVal i (ρ ≤j ) ≤ acVal i (ρ ≤j ) for all j ≤ j < k. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is some j ≤ j < k such that acVal i (ρ ≤j ) > acVal i (ρ ≤j ). We are going to construct a strategy σ i for player i which witnesses that acVal i (ρ ≤j ) ≥ acVal i (ρ ≤j ) showing a contradiction.
We are going to define a strategy profile (σ i , σ −i ) by distinguishing two cases. 1. If acVal i (ρ ≤j ) > aVal i (ρ ≤j ), then let (σ i , σ −i ) be a strategy profile, and ε > 0 such that 
We define similarly,
where σ 0 −i is an arbitrary strategy profile for −i. Now, by construction, Out ρ ≤j (σ i , σ −i ) = Out ρ ≤j (σ i , σ −i ) which has payoff at least acVal i (ρ ≤j ) − ε > acVal i (ρ ≤j ) in the first case, and equal to acVal i (ρ ≤j ) > acVal i (ρ ≤j ) in the second case. Moreover, against any other strategy τ of players −i, we have
since player i switches to σ wco i,h at any minimal history h that is not a prefix of the outcome of (σ i , σ −i ); and for any such h, aVal i (h) ≥ aVal i (ρ ≤j ). In fact, we saw above that aVal i (h ≤|h|−1 ) ≥ aVal i (ρ ≤j ). Moreover, since h ≤|h|−1 ends in a vertex in V −i , the antagonistic value cannot decrease: so
This is a contradiction since from history ρ ≤j , σ i achieves a cooperative value greater than acVal i (ρ ≤j ), and a worst-case value of at least aVal i (ρ ≤j ).
To conclude, we have shown that for all j ≤ j < k both aVal i (ρ ≤j ) ≤ aVal i (ρ ≤j ) and acVal i (ρ ≤j ) ≥ acVal i (ρ ≤j ). Since, by definition aVal(ρ ≤j ) ≤ acVal i (ρ ≤j ), for all j ≥ j, and k was chosen arbitrarily, the result follows.
, and acVal i (ρ ≤j ) = aVal i (ρ ≤j ), it follows that all outcomes of σ i that extend ρ ≤j must have payoff exactly aVal i (ρ ≤j ). In particular,
Towards a contradiction, assume that this is not an equality. We cannot have aVal i (ρ ≤k ) < aVal i (ρ ≤j ) since, this would contradict aVal i (ρ ≤j , σ) = aVal i (ρ ≤j ). Also, if we assume that aVal i (ρ ≤k ) > aVal i (ρ ≤j ), since ρ ≤k is compatible with σ i from history ρ ≤j , it follows that acVal i (ρ ≤j ) ≥ aVal i (ρ ≤k ), contradiction.
The result follows.
We can now prove Thm. 13.
Proof of Thm. 13. ⇐ Suppose that ρ is compatible with an admissible strategy σ i for player i. We will show that for any prefix h of ρ, such that last(h) ∈ V i , ρ, |h| satisfies either
First, observe that (ρ, |h|) |= aVal i q for exactly one q ∈ aValues i . Now, since σ i is admissible, we have, from Thm. 11, that at h either (1) or (2) holds.
Otherwise, let j be the first index where ρ j = ρ j . We have ρ j−1 ∈ V −i and j > |h| because σ i and σ −i are compatible with h. 
By Lem. 21 (b), we have that payoff i (ρ) = q and aVal i is constantly equal to q along ρ after h; so ϕ 2 is satisfied by ρ, |h|.
⇒ Let ρ be an outcome which satisfies Φ i adm . We define strategy σ i for player i which follows ρ, and on any history that is not a prefix of ρ, switches immediately either to a strongly cooperative-optimal or to a worst-case optimal strategy, depending on whether ϕ 1 or ϕ 2 holds. Formally, for each history h, let us fix a strongly cooperative-optimal strategy σ sco h for player i in the game G h , a worst-case optimal strategy σ Let us start with histories h that are not a prefix of ρ, say, of the form h = h 0 h where h 0 is the smallest prefix of h ending in V i which is not a prefix of ρ. We show that either (1) or (2) hold for h and σ i by distinguishing two cases.
1.
Assume σ i follows σ sco h0 at h 0 , which is strongly cooperative-optimal, thus admissible in the game G h0 by Lem. 6. This strategy thus satisfies (1) at h , that is,
or it satisfies (2), which is
We are going to show that (1) or (2) hold for G at history h. Assume (6) holds at h in G h0 . By Lem. 2, we have that the LHS of (6) is equal to aVal i (G, h 0 h ) = aVal i (G, h) . But, by the definition of σ i , the RHS of (6) is equal to cVal i (G, h 0 h , σ i ) since σ i (h 0 g) = σ wco h0 (g) for all g ∈ Hist last(h0) (G). Assume (7) holds at h in G h0 . By Lem. 2, we have that aVal i (G h0 , h ) = aVal i (G, h) and acVal i (G h0 , h ) = acVal i (G, h) . Moreover, aVal i (G h0 , h , σ . We claim that, in fact, we have equality in this case. Towards, a contradiction, assume that this is not the case. Thus, it holds that aVal i (ρ ≤k , σ i ) < cVal i (ρ ≤k , σ i ). Since we have already established that aVal i (ρ ≤k , σ i ) = aVal i (ρ ≤k ), this implies (by def. of acVal i ) that acVal i (ρ ≤k ) > aVal i (ρ ≤k ). Contradiction. Hence (2) holds.
For any history ρ ≤k with ρ k ∈ V i , we consider two cases.
If (ρ, k) |= ϕ 1 then either payoff i (ρ) > aVal i (ρ ≤k ), and (1) holds, or (ρ, k ) |= gAlt i q for some position k > k and for q = aVal i (ρ ≥k ). In the latter case, ρ k ∈ V −i and cVal i (ρ k ) > aVal i (ρ k ), so for any history ρ ≤k · v with v = ρ k +1 , by construction, σ i switches to a strongly cooperative-optimal strategy; thus cVal i (ρ ≤k · v, σ i ) > aVal i (h). It then follows that cVal i (h, σ i ) ≥ cVal i (ρ ≤k · v, σ i ) > aVal i (h), which satisfies (1). Otherwise (ρ, k) |= ϕ 2 ∧ ¬ϕ 1 . In particular, since ϕ 2 is satisfied, there is some q such that payoff i (ρ) = q = aVal i (ρ ≤k ) = acVal i (ρ ≤k ) and ρ ≥k |= G(aVal i q ). Hence the antagonistic values of all histories h extending ρ ≥k are all equal to aVal i (ρ ≤k ). Since σ i immediately switches to a worst-case optimal strategy when we do not follow ρ, all outcomes of σ i extending ρ ≤k have payoff at least aVal i (ρ ≤k ), so aVal i (σ i , ρ ≤k ) = aVal i (ρ ≤k ). Moreover outcomes of σ i from ρ ≤k has coinciding cooperative and antagonistic values. That is, we necessarily have that cVal i (ρ ≤k , σ i ) = aVal i (ρ ≤k , σ i ). Indeed, if this were not the case, then the cooperative value would be strictly higher and this would contradict the fact that aVal i (ρ ≤k ) = acVal i (ρ ≤k )-this is by definition of acVal i . This shows aVal i (ρ ≤k , σ i ) = cVal i (ρ ≤k , σ i ) = aVal i (ρ ≤k ) = acVal i (ρ ≤k ), hence (2) holds.
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Making infimum and supremum functions prefix-independent
The payoff functions defined using Inf and Sup are not prefix-independent. Nevertheless, our results are also applicable to those measures after applying a simple and classical transformation to the game structure. This transformation ensures prefix-independence for those measures for all plays in the new game and a bijection between the strategies in the original game and the strategies in the modified game. For Inf (rest. Sup), the transformation is as follows: for each player i ∈ P , we record, as additional information in the vertices of the game, the minimal (resp. maximal) value seen so far with the weight function w i . We then modify the weight function to output the recorded value if the original label of the edge that is taken is larger (resp. smaller) than or equal to the recorded value, and to output the
